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Fix 550 5.7.509 Access Denied (DMARC policy of reject)

Microsoft rejected your message because it failed DMARC for the domain in your From: address, and that domain tells receivers to reject mail that fails. Check the policy, SPF and DKIM records below, then find the sending service that doesn’t align and fix it.

Last verified 2 October 2026.

What “550 5.7.509 Access denied” means

The bounce reads:

550 5.7.509 Access denied, sending domain [domain] does not pass DMARC verification and has a DMARC policy of reject.

Three things happened, in this order:

  1. Microsoft evaluated DMARC for the From: domain. The domain in the bounce is the one in your From: address, not your mail provider’s.
  2. The message failed DMARC. DMARC passes when SPF or DKIM passes and the domain it passed for aligns with the From: domain. Here neither did. Often SPF and DKIM both pass, but for the sending service’s own domain, which doesn’t count.
  3. The domain publishes p=reject. For a subdomain without its own DMARC record, the parent’s sp= tag sets the policy (it defaults to p=). Microsoft honours reject, so it refused the message during delivery instead of putting it in junk.

It comes from Outlook.com and Hotmail inboxes and from Microsoft 365 organisations, whose anti-phishing policies honour the sender’s DMARC policy when “Honor DMARC record policy” is on (Microsoft recommends it). A 5xx code is a permanent rejection: resending the same message from the same service gets the same bounce.

5.7.509 vs 5.7.515: 550 5.7.515 is Outlook.com’s high-volume sender rule: your domain doesn’t meet the required authentication level (SPF, DKIM and a DMARC record), whatever its policy. 5.7.509 is about your own policy: the domain asked for failing mail to be rejected, and this message failed.

5.7.509 vs 5.7.23: Exchange Online’s 550 5.7.23 means a destination server rejected your mail because SPF failed, whatever your DMARC policy.

Sources: Microsoft Learn, Set up DMARC to validate email in Microsoft 365 (DMARC for inbound mail, alignment troubleshooting, trusted ARC sealers); RFC 9989 (DMARC, which replaced RFC 7489 in May 2026) (checked 1 October 2026).

Check the records behind the bounce

Enter the domain named in the bounce (the one in your From: address). The lookups run in your browser against public DNS and show the DMARC policy that applies, whether SPF is valid, and whether DKIM keys are published at the common selectors.

What this can and can’t tell you: it reads the records the domain publishes right now, through Cloudflare’s public resolver (Google’s when Cloudflare’s fails). It can’t check alignment, because that depends on the Return-Path and DKIM d= domains inside each message. DKIM keys can’t be listed from DNS, so it checks the same common selectors as the DMARC checker (Microsoft 365’s selector1 and selector2, Google Workspace’s google, and the defaults of common sending services); your services may sign with others. For a subdomain without its own record, it finds the organisational domain’s record by walking up the name, skipping public suffixes such as co.uk or com.pe (from the ICANN section of the Public Suffix List) and hosting platforms such as github.io. For the full A–F grade with MTA-STS, BIMI and DNSSEC, use the DMARC checker.

Find the sender that failed

Every service that sends with your From: address must pass DMARC on its own: your mailbox provider, your newsletter tool, your CRM, help desk, invoicing and website forms. The bounce, or a copy of the same mail delivered to any mailbox you control, tells you which one failed. Open the message source (Outlook: File > Properties > Internet headers; Gmail: Show original) and find the Authentication-Results header. Microsoft’s looks like this:

Authentication-Results: spf=pass (sender IP is 198.51.100.10)
  smtp.mailfrom=bounces.mailer.example.net; dkim=pass (signature was verified)
  header.d=mailer.example.net; dmarc=fail action=oreject
  header.from=example.com;compauth=fail reason=000
header.from=The From: domain DMARC is checked for (example.com).
smtp.mailfrom=The Return-Path (envelope sender) domain SPF was checked for. Here it’s the service’s domain, so SPF passed but doesn’t align.
header.d=The domain that signed DKIM. Again the service’s own, so DKIM passed but doesn’t align.
dmarc=fail action=orejectNeither aligned, and the domain’s policy is reject. action=pct.reject means, in Microsoft’s words, “Sender published p=reject with pct= less than 100; this message was in the sampled percentage”: the reject policy was applied to it.

The sending IP, the smtp.mailfrom domain and the Received: lines name the service. If you can’t get a header, your DMARC aggregate reports (the rua= address) list every IP that sent as your domain and whether SPF and DKIM aligned.

Fix it: make the sender align

One aligned pass is enough for DMARC, and DKIM is the sturdier one because it survives forwarding. Do both where the service supports it.

1. Sign DKIM with your domain

Set the service up to sign with d=yourdomain.com (or a subdomain of it, under relaxed alignment). This is usually called domain authentication or custom DKIM, and means publishing one or two records the service gives you.

2. Put the Return-Path on your domain

For SPF to align, the envelope sender (smtp.mailfrom) must be your domain or, under relaxed alignment, a subdomain such as bounces.yourdomain.com, and that name’s SPF record must list the service. Many services set this up as a “custom return-path” or “custom MAIL FROM” CNAME. Adding the service’s include: to your root SPF record only helps when the Return-Path is your root domain. Keep a single SPF record (merge duplicates) under 10 DNS lookups (how to cut them); a broken record fails SPF for every message.

3. Check the alignment mode

With aspf=s or adkim=s in your DMARC record, only an exact match with the From: domain aligns: a bounces.yourdomain.com Return-Path or a d=mail.yourdomain.com signature fails. Switch to relaxed (remove the tag) unless you need strict.

Before and after: one sender, fixed

Take the failing message from the header example above: example.com publishes p=reject, and a newsletter service at mailer.example.net (a placeholder; your service’s names will differ) sends as news@example.com from 198.51.100.10.

$ dig TXT _dmarc.example.com +short
"v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com"

Before: nothing on example.com for the service. SPF passed for bounces.mailer.example.net and DKIM for mailer.example.net; neither is example.com or a subdomain of it, so DMARC failed and Microsoft rejected with 5.7.509. The service’s selector and return-path names don’t exist yet:

$ dig CNAME s1._domainkey.example.com +short
$ dig CNAME bounce.example.com +short
$

After: publish the records the service’s domain authentication gives you and turn it on there. Typically a DKIM CNAME, so the service signs with d=example.com, and a return-path CNAME, so the service can use bounce.example.com as the envelope sender. The CNAME makes the SPF lookup for bounce.example.com return the service’s own SPF record, which lists its servers:

$ dig CNAME s1._domainkey.example.com +short
s1.domainkey.mailer.example.net.
$ dig CNAME bounce.example.com +short
mailer.example.net.

The next message to an Outlook mailbox shows both checks passing for your domain:

Authentication-Results: spf=pass (sender IP is 198.51.100.10)
  smtp.mailfrom=bounce.example.com; dkim=pass (signature was verified)
  header.d=example.com; dmarc=pass action=none
  header.from=example.com;compauth=pass reason=100

bounce.example.com and example.com share the organisational domain, so SPF aligns under relaxed alignment; header.d=example.com matches exactly, so DKIM aligns too. Either one alone would make dmarc=pass. If you can only do one, do DKIM: it still aligns after plain forwarding, when SPF fails. The records only affect messages the service sends after it verifies them, so check the header of a new message.

Forwarding and mailing lists

When a recipient forwards your mail, or a mailing list resends it, the new server isn’t in your SPF, and a list that edits the subject or adds a footer breaks your DKIM signature. Mail signed with your domain survives plain forwarding, so DKIM is the fix on your side. The rest is the receiver’s: intermediaries can add an ARC seal, and a Microsoft 365 organisation can add the forwarder or list as a trusted ARC sealer.

A temporary option: p=quarantine

If a business-critical sender bounces and the fix will take days, you can change p=reject to p=quarantine (and sp=, if set) at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. Microsoft then delivers failing mail to junk instead of refusing it. This lowers your protection: spoofed mail using your domain reaches junk folders instead of being refused. Do it only while you fix the sender, then go back to p=reject. A cleaner long-term setup is to send that service from its own subdomain with its own DMARC record.

FAQ

SPF and DKIM both pass. Why does DMARC still fail with 5.7.509?

DMARC needs SPF or DKIM to pass for a domain that aligns with the From: address. A service that sends with its own Return-Path (smtp.mailfrom) and signs DKIM with its own domain (header.d) passes both checks for its domain, not yours, so DMARC fails. Fix it by having the service use a Return-Path on your domain or sign DKIM with d= set to your domain.

Can a DNS checker tell me which sender failed?

No. DNS shows the policy and records you publish, not what happened to a particular message. The Authentication-Results header of a failing message, or your DMARC aggregate reports, show which server sent it and whether SPF and DKIM aligned.

Should I lower my DMARC policy to stop the bounces?

Only as a short-term measure while you fix the sender. Changing p=reject to p=quarantine stops the 5.7.509 rejections, but failing mail, including spoofed mail, is then delivered to junk folders instead of being refused. Fix the sender’s alignment, then move back to p=reject.

Why do forwarded messages and mailing lists bounce with 5.7.509?

Forwarding sends the message from a new server, so SPF fails, and a mailing list that edits the subject or adds a footer breaks the DKIM signature. With both broken, DMARC fails. Mail you sign with DKIM survives plain forwarding. For lists and gateways, the receiving organisation can trust the intermediary’s ARC seal; Microsoft 365 calls this a trusted ARC sealer.

Checking many domains?

If you manage sending domains for clients or brands, Email Security Signals runs the same DNS checks on a whole list and returns one row per domain with the DMARC policy, SPF lookup count, DKIM selectors found and an A–F grade, ready to export as CSV. $0.02 per graded domain ($20 per 1,000); invalid inputs, domains that don’t exist, DNS lookup failures and duplicates are free.

Check a list on the Apify Store →

Or have us grade your list free: send up to 100 domains to hello@siftsmith.com, and we’ll run them through Email Security Signals and email you a CSV file with each domain’s grade, the issues found and whether it meets the bulk-sender rules, or the reason a domain couldn’t be graded.